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An Analysis of Selective Service System v. Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group
Section 1113 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act passed in 1982
prohibits the receipt of Title IV educational funds by students who do not
comply with draft registration requirements. In Selective Service System v.
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, the United States Supreme Court
upheld section 1113 in the face of a multi-tiered constitutional challenge. Af-
ter exploring the history of section 1113, the author examines the Supreme
Court's analysis of each of the constitutional challenges: bill of attainder,
privilege against self-incrimination, and equal protection. Finally, the author
investigates the probable impact of the Court's decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which per-
petuated a growing apprehension of the Soviet Union's military
strength, President Carter reinstituted mandatory draft registration.'
As a result, young men born after 1960 must register for the draft
within thirty days of their eighteenth birthday, or face possible crimi-
nal charges.2 The majority of these young men have complied with
the registration requirement; however, many have failed to do so.
3
A variety of explanations may account for such widespread non-
compliance. Inevitably there are those who have willfully failed to
register for the draft due to religious or moral convictions. However,
many nonregistrants may be unaware of the registration require-
ment. Still others, although aware of the registration requirement,
may not comprehend the importance of compliance.
Pursuant to Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest
Research Group,4 innocent as well as willful nonregistrants are pre-
cluded from receiving Title IV educational financial aid. In this deci-
sion, the Supreme Court upheld section 1113 of the Department of
1. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 453 at 233-34 (1982).
2. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (1982).
3. Approximately 674,000 draft-eligible men had failed to register at the time of
the enactment of section 1113 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 50
U.S.C. app. § 462(f) (1982). Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group, 104 S. Ct. 3348, 3361 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4. 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984).
Defense Authorization Act,5 which restricts student financial aid
based on compliance with the draft registration requirement.6 The
Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger, held that sec-
tion 1113 is not an unconstitutional bill of attainder, 7 that it does not
violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,s and
that it does not violate the fifth amendment right to equal protection
under the law.9
After examining the historical development of bills of attainder,
fifth amendment self-incrimination, and equal protection, this note
will analyze the Selective Service System decision. The opinion of the
Court will be summarized, along with its projected impact on individ-
uals and future legislation.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Section 1113
The United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall have
Power To . . . raise and support Armies .... ,1o Congress is also
empowered "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested [in Congress]
by this Constitution .... "-1 Pursuant to this authority, Congress
passed legislation empowering the President to require by proclama-
tion the registration of both male citizens and male resident aliens
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six.12 President Ford dis-
continued registration on March 29, 1975,13 but President Carter rein-
stated it on July 2, 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.14
Section 1113 was introduced by Representative Gerald Solomon' 5
on July 28, 1982 during the House debate on Defense Department
spending for 1983.16 A similar amendment had been introduced to
5. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f) (1982). See infra note 91 for the full text of section
1113.
6. The draft registration requirement is embodied in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1982).
7. For a discussion of bills of attainder, see infra notes 36-46 and accompanying
text.
8. For a discussion of fifth amendment self-incrimination, see infra notes 59-74
and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of fifth amendment equal protection, see infra notes 75-88
and accompanying text.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
12. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1982).
13. Proclamation No. 4360, 40 Fed. Reg. 14,567 (1975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 453 at 233 (1982).
14. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 453 at 233-34 (1982).
15. Representative Solomon is a Republican from New York.
16. 128 CONG. REc. H4756 (daily ed. July 28, 1982).
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the Senate on May 12, 1982 by Senators Mack Mattingly17 and S.I.
Hayakawa.18 After a vigorous debate, the amendment passed by an
overwhelming bipartisan majority in each house.19
The Department of Education issued final regulations governing
section 1113 on April 11, 1983.20 The regulations require a male stu-
dent applying for Title IV aid to certify, in a statement of registration
compliance, that he is either registered with the Selective Service or
that, for a specified reason, he is not required to register.21 Female
students are required to complete an identical statement but are ex-
empt from registration.22 A student who purposefully falsifies his
statement of registration compliance is subject to a fine or imprison-
ment, or both.23
Beginning on July 1, 1985, there will be an additional requirement
necessary to fulfill the mandate of section 1113. First, the student
must file the statement of registration compliance previously re-
quired.24 Second, the student must submit documentation to the edu-
cational institution he is planning to attend verifying that he has
registered with the Selective Service.25 If a student fails to meet
these requirements, he must be given written notice that he has been
denied Title IV assistance due to failure to comply with the Act.26 A
student who has been so notified, and who has not registered, may do
so within thirty days of receiving the notice or before the end of the
educational payment period. He may then file a statement of com-
17. Senator Mattingly is a Republican from Georgia.
18. 128 CONG. REC. S4943 (daily ed. May 12, 1982). Senator Hayakawa is a Repub-
lican from California.
19. For a complete record of the congressional debates, see 128 CONG. REC. S4942-
45 (daily ed. May 12, 1982); 128 CONG. REC. H4756-72 (daily ed. July 28, 1982).
20. Regulations implementing section 1113 are codified at 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.24-.28
(1984).
21. 34 C.F.R. § 668.24 (1984). Specified reasons excusing registration include being
in the armed services on active duty, not having reached the age of eighteen, being
born before 1960, or being a permanent resident of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands or the Northern Mariana Islands. I& § 668.25.
22. See id § 668.25.
23. id.; see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (1982).
24. See supra note 21.
25. Appropriate documentation to be used to verify registration compliance in-
cludes a copy of the student's registration acknowledgement letter, a financial aid tran-
script prepared pursuant to section 668.14 including the student's selective service
number, or other documentation from the Selective Service approved by both the Sec-
retary and Director of the Selective Service System. 34 C.F.R. § 668.26 (1984). A stu-
dent temporarily verifying his registration by submitting an affidavit must submit
documentation within one hundred and twenty days from the date of the affidavit. Id.
26. I& § 668.27; 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f)(4) (1982).
pliance to establish his eligibility for assistance. 27 Finally, a student
who has been denied benefits may request a hearing to determine
compliance with section 1113.28
Section 1113 has created considerable controversy among political
figures. Representative Solomon, the amendment's strongest propo-
nent, stated: "If young men want the privilege of getting low-cost,
taxpayer funded college loans, then they damn well ought to live up
to their duty to obey the law."29 The amendment has also met with
strong opposition. During the House debate, Representative Edgar
criticized the bill by stating: "This amendment has the obvious pri-
mary objective of increasing the number of men registered....
However, it also has a secondary, and more subtle, objective, which is
to punish those individuals who do not register."30 Representative
Patterson agreed with Representative Edgar, stating the amendment
to be both punitive and an administrative burden.31
Several public interest groups also became involved in the contro-
versy. College administrators joined the opposition, claiming that the
law represented increased administrative burdens as well as unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion.32 Additionally, various religious insti-
tutions joined the colleges in an attempt to support those students
whose federal loan applications had been denied.33 This controversy
led to the filing of a suit by the Minnesota Public Interest Group in
1982,34 and to the final Supreme Court decision on July 5, 1984.35
A variety of commonly discussed issues may arise in determining
the constitutionality of section 1113. The Supreme Court considered
27. 34 C.F.R. § 668.27 (1984).
28. Id. A student is entitled to a hearing only if he is in compliance with registra-
tion requirements and has filed a written request for a hearing within the award year
for which he was denied Title IV assistance, or within thirty days following the end of
the payment period. At the hearing, the student bears the burden of proving compli-
ance with the requirements of the Military Selective Service Act. The hearing is lim-
ited to determination of compliance with section 1113. The hearing officer may not
consider challenges, constitutional or otherwise, to the requirements that a student
must verify compliance with the registration act. Id.
29. 129 CONG. REC. E315 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983) (extension of remarks of Rep.
Solomon).
30. 128 CONG. REC. H4760 (daily ed. July 28, 1982).
31. Representative Patterson stated: "Not only is it highly discriminatory in na-
ture and would require significant expenditures of time and money, but it is entirely
unnecessary .... We already have a law on the books for punishing those who fail to
register for the draft .... Id.
Failure to register within thirty days of one's eighteenth birthday is a felony, punish-
able by imprisonment for up to five years and/or a fine of up to $10,000.00. 50 U.S.C.
app. § 462(a) (1982).
32. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1983, at C1, col. 1.
33. I&
34. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp.
925 (D. Minn. 1983).
35. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3348.
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three issues in Selective Service System. The first issue concerned
whether section 1113 constitutes a bill of attainder because it states
that those who fail to register as required by the Military Selective
Service Act are ineligible for Title IV assistance. The second issue in-
quired whether section 1113 violates the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination by compelling those who wish Title IV
assistance, and who are required to register, to file a statement of re-
gistration compliance with their colleges. Finally, the third issue ex-
amined whether section 1113 denies equal protection under the fifth
amendment by enforcing the registration requirements of the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act only against those nonregistrants who are
in need of financial assistance.
B. Bill of Attainder
In determining the constitutionality of section 1113, the Supreme
Court discussed whether the statute constitutes a bill of attainder.
Therefore, an analysis of bills of attainder is needed to understand
the Court's decision.
1. Origin of bill of attainder
A bill of attainder is "a law that legislatively determines guilt and
inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual [or group of indi-
viduals] without provision of the protections of a judicial trial."36 It
is believed to have originated in common law England during the
fourteenth or fifteenth century.37 Traditionally, it consisted of legis-
lation enacted by Parliament and the punishment inflicted was the
condemning to death of a specified group.38 Such legislation was
most often employed as a means by which to punish political activity
deemed threatening or treasonous.3 9 Parliamentary acts inflicting a
less severe form of punishment were called bills of pains and
36. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977).
37. Lehmann, The Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Survey of the Decisional Law, 5
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 767, 772 (1978). The exact origins of bills of attainder are un-
clear; however, the first Parliamentary Act known to have possessed the traditional
attributes of attainder was passed in 1392. Id.
38. Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified Guarantee of Process, 50
BROOKLYN L. REV. 77, 83-84 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, An Unqualified Guaran-
tee of Process]. Heirs were forbidden to inherit the attainted person's property as he
was decreed to have had a "corruption of blood." Comment, The Bounds of Legislative
Specitfication: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330,
330-31 (1962-63). Those attainted were deemed never to have been born at all. Note,
An Unqualified Guarantee of Process, supra at 83-84.
39. Note, An Unqualified Guarantee of Process, supra note 38, at 83.
penalties.40
Bills of attainder were prevalent in the United States during the
post-Revolutionary War period. Many states enacted legislation
aimed at punishing those considered to have been loyalists during the
war.41 Thus, the framers were wary of these bills of attainder as
they convened to draft the Constitution in 1787. In a conscious effort
to prohibit such legislation, they provided in the Constitution that
Congress shall pass "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law" 42
and that "[n]o State shall. . . pass any Bill of Attainder, [or] ex post
facto. .. Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. .... 43
The framers intended that the power to try, convict and then punish
was to be a judicial power that the legislative branch was forbidden
to exercise. 44
A bill of attainder is modernly identified by four characteristics: it
is (1) a legislative act (2) which imposes punishment (3) upon a desig-
nated person or class of persons (4) without benefit of a judicial
trial.45 The Supreme Court's analysis of bills of attainder has not
been consistent. An overview of the landmark decisions is necessary
to understand the decision in Selective Service System. 46
2. Case development
The Supreme Court was first confronted with the bill of attainder
doctrine shortly after the Civil War. During this period, both the
federal and state governments passed laws compelling certain classes
of individuals to take expurgatory oaths disavowing past actions of
disloyalty to the United States, or be denied the right to enter certain
40. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-4 at 484 (1978).
41. See Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution, 3
Nw. U.L. REV. 81 (1908-09).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. An ex post facto law is one which is "passed after
the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the
legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 520
(5th ed. 1979).
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
44. Lehmann, supra note 37, at 778-79. Two theories have been advanced to jus-
tify prohibiting bills of attainder. The first is the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Constitution, as set forth in the first three articles, intended for the three
branches of government, executive, legislative, and judicial, to have independent pow-
ers. The judiciary was to have the sole authority to try and convict. The legislature, in
enacting bills of attainder, encroaches on the authority expressly delegated to the judi-
ciary under the Constitution. The second theory is based on the concept of procedural
due process. The Constitution expressly guarantees each United States citizen the
right to counsel in a criminal proceeding, the right to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses, and the right to have an impartial jury. Legislative trials offer none
of these safeguards.
45. Id, at 790-91. This definition was first espoused by the Court in United States
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946), and has provided a convenient means by which to
analyze such legislation.
46. 104 S. Ct. at 3348.
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specified vocations. 47 These laws were struck down on the ground
that they were punitive rather than regulatory, as they were passed
to punish the person, not to regulate the profession.48
During the 1940's and 1950's, the Court addressed bill of attainder
challenges directed at state laws passed in response to the communist
crisis. One law was struck down which denied government appropri-
ations to pay the salaries of government employees accused of being
communist subversives.49 The law was clearly designed to punish
named individuals without the benefit of a judicial trial.50 However,
during the McCarthy era, the Court deviated from its traditional
analysis to uphold statutes designed to curb subversive activities of
individuals labeled as communists.51 These statutes were held to be
constitutional, as they were intended to alter future conduct, rather
than to punish past behavior.52
The Supreme Court, during the 1960's, applied the bill of attainder
doctrine in a more liberal fashion. A law was invalidated which
made it a crime to serve as an officer of a labor union, during or
within five years of one's membership in the Communist Party.53
The doctrine was viewed as a general safeguard against "trial by leg-
47. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866); Ex Parte Garland, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
In Cummings, the target of a state law was an ordained Roman Catholic priest who
was convicted for teaching and preaching after refusing to take the loyalty oath re-
quired by the Missouri Constitution. He was sentenced to pay a fine of $500.00 and was
to be jailed until that fine was paid. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 281-82.
In Garland, the target of a federal statute was a lawyer who refused to take an oath
of loyalty to the United States. He was thereafter denied admittance to practice as an
attorney before any federal court. 77 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 334-38.
48. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320. See also Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 379-
80.
49. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
50. Id. at 316.
51. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1960)
(statute requiring all communist action organizations to register with the Attorney
General); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (statute con-
ditioning recognition of a labor organization on the filing of affidavits by its officers
stating that they did not belong to the communist party and did not believe in over-
throwing the government).
52. Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 87; Douds, 339 U.S. at 413-14.
53. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). Section 504 of the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was enacted to replace section 9(h) of the
National Labor Relations Act, which the Supreme Court upheld in Douds, 339 U.S. at
382. Brown, 381 U.S. at 438-39. In Brown, however, the Court found that section 504
isolated a sufficiently specified group-the Communist Party. Id. at 451-52. The Court
also found that section 504 inflicted inescapable punishment on that specific group by
disqualifying past members of the party from serving as labor union officers. Id. at
458.
islature" rather than as the narrow, technical legislative prohibition
seen during the 1950's.54
The most recent bill of attainder decision,55 although heavily criti-
cized,56 was relied on extensively by the Court in Selective Service
System. A federal statute requiring the General Services Adminis-
tration to take custody of former President Nixon's presidential pa-
pers and tape recordings was held not to be a bill of attainder. 57 The
statute was viewed as a nonpunitive regulatory function, as it was ef-
fected to "preserv[e] the availability of judicial evidence and. . . his-
torically relevant materials."' 8
This twisted path of decisions followed by the Supreme Court fi-
nally led to Selective Service System, where the Court once again up-
held a federal statute against a bill of attainder challenge.
C. Fifth Amendment: SeVf-Incrimination
The second major issue of importance to the Supreme Court in Se-
lective Service System was whether section 1113 violates the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The fifth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, that "[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."5 9 Essentially, the principal purpose of the amend-
ment is to protect the individual from being coerced by the govern-
ment to reveal self-incriminating information.60 Thus, an analysis of
54. Brown, 381 U.S. at 442.
55. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
56. See Lehmann, supra note 37, at 1009 ("the majority's analysis... is, in many
respects, disappointingly superficial and occasionally confused .. "); Comment, Con-
ditioning Financial Aid on Draft Registration: A Bill of Attainder and Fifth Amend-
ment Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 789-94 (1984) ("The Nixon case is ... weak
precedent for a bill of attainder analysis."); Note, An Unqualified Guarantee of Pro-
cess, supra note 38, at 99 ("Nixon is a confusing case at best.").
57. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425.
58. Id. at 478-79.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
60. The policy underlying the privilege against self-incrimination was most com-
prehensively explained by Justice Goldberg in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964):
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminat-
ing statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense
of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for dis-
turbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individ-
ual to shoulder the entire load;" . . . our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life;" . . . our distrust of self-deprecatory state-
ments; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to
the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
Id. at 55.
[Vol. 12: 949, 1985] Selective Service System v. MPIRG
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the Court's modern approach to the fifth amendment illustrates two
central issues which commonly arise: (1) whether some form of gov-
ernment coercion exists, and (2) whether the coerced disclosure
presents a real and substantial threat of incrimination.
The strict language of the amendment seems to imply that govern-
ment coercion is forbidden only in the context of criminal trials.
However, the phrase, "in any criminal case," has been extended to
certain other areas such as grand jury proceedings, 61 police custodial
interrogations, 62 civil proceedings, 63 investigation by administrative
officials, 64 and legislative committee hearings.6 5 Indeed, the "privi-
lege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, adminis-
trative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory."6 6
In addition to being involved in a proceeding in which the Court
will recognize government coercion, an individual must be compelled
to offer evidence which is testimonial or communicative in nature.6 7
Not only does the privilege extend to information that is in itself in-
criminatory, but also to information that might possibly lead to other
evidence likely to be incriminatory.6 8
The Court has, in recent years, recognized a new category of gov-
ernmental coercion which operates against an individual's economic
interest.6 9 Governmental compulsion has been held impermissible
61. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (New York statute which precluded
award of government contract to any person who failed to waive immunity when
called to testify before a grand jury concerning the contract held unconstitutional).
62. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (prosecution may not use statements,
either exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from a custodial interrogation, unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination).
63. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U:S. 801 (1977) (New York statute under which
an attorney was divested of his state political office for refusing to waive his fifth
amendment privilege in a civil proceeding held unconstitutional).
64. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949) (witness entitled to claim fifth
amendment privilege before an examiner of the Office of Price Administration).
65. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (defendant's references to fifth
amendment privilege was sufficient to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
in a congressional hearing).
66. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 94.
67. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
68. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 94 (the privilege "protects any disclosures which the wit-
ness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could
lead to other evidence that might be so used"); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,
486-87 (1951) ("The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in them-
selves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces
those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
claimant .... ").
69. Turley, 414 U.S. at 70 (New York statutes which require government contrac-
where the government has imposed some sanction making an individ-
ual's exercise of his fifth amendment privilege costly.70 As Justice
Douglas stated, "[w]here the choice is 'between the rock and the
whirlpool,' duress is inherent in deciding to 'waive' one or the
other." 7 1  Such government compulsion is constitutionally
impermissible.
The second issue arising under the fifth amendment concerns the
threat of incrimination. The privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation does not protect an individual from all government compelled
disclosures.72 The privilege is effective only if the individual faces a
"real and appreciable" danger of self-incrimination. 73 In other words,
an imagined or insubstantial threat of self-incrimination "having ref-
erence to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency" 74 is
not protected by the fifth amendment.
D. Fifth Amendment: Equal Protection
The third issue discussed by the Supreme Court in Selective Ser-
vice System was whether section 1113 violates equal protection under
the fifth amendment. Equal protection generally guarantees that all
citizens will be treated equally under the law.75 Both state and fed-
eral governments are restricted by this guarantee; however, the basis
for each of these restrictions rests on entirely distinct grounds.
Although the fourteenth amendment commands that "[n]o State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws,"76 the Constitution contains no such express prohibi-
tion concerning the federal government. Instead, the federal
prohibition is derived from the theory that a governmental classifica-
tion, which operates to deny any person equal protection under law,
tors to waive their immunity or face cancellation of their contracts and disqualification
from future contracts for five years held unconstitutional); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493 (1967) (New Jersey statute which compelled police officers being investigated
to either incriminate themselves by testifying or lose their jobs held unconstitutional);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (lawyer who refused to testify at a bar discipli-
nary proceeding could not be penalized by disbarment for invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination).
70. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (a trial court or prosecutor comment-
ing on defendant's failure to testify is a violation of fifth amendment privilege).
71. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 498.
72. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) ("[tlhe power of govern-
ment to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other governmen-
tal agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence"). Additionally,
the power to subpoena and confront witnesses is embodied in the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
73. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896).
74. Id,
75. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 517 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LAw].
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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is violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.77 As
the issue arising under section 1113 of the Selective Service Act is
one that concerns federal government legislation, this note will out-
line the historical evolution of fifth amendment equal protection.
The absence of an express guarantee of equal protection binding
the federal government is attributed to the framers of the fourteenth
amendment. The framers, in drafting the amendment, intended to
empower Congress with the ability to impose restrictions on racial
discrimination within the states.78 It never occurred to the framers to
impose such a restriction on Congress itself.7 9 It was not until the
1950's that the Supreme Court compensated for the framers' over-
sight and expanded the scope of the fifth amendment to encompass
equal protection concerns.8 0
The Supreme Court has since expanded fifth amendment equal
protection to the extent that such claims are treated precisely the
same as those arising under the fourteenth amendment81 In fact,
the treatment is so similar that fourteenth amendment decisions
have repeatedly served as precedent for cases arising under the fifth
amendment.8 2 Thus, "if a [discriminatory] classification would be in-
valid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
77. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
78. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV.
541 (1976-77).
79. Id. at 541-42.
80. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 497. In Bolling, the Supreme Court held that racial "segre-
gation in public education is not reasonably related to [a] proper governmental objec-
tive." Thus, such racial discrimination violated the plaintiff's fifth amendment due
process rights based on equal protection. Id. at 500.
81. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). See Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975) (although the fifth amendment does not contain an
express equal protection guarantee as does the fourteenth amendment, due process
does prohibit the federal government from engaging in discrimination which is neces-
sarily violative of due process); Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499 ("[Ihe concepts of equal pro-
tection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive.").
82. See generally Karst, supra note 78, at 554.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1977), the Court held statutes providing
"that spouses of male members of the uniformed services are dependents for purposes
of [receiving various] benefits [while] spouses of female members are not dependents
unless they are in fact dependent for over one-half of their support" as violative of the
fifth amendment. Id. at 677. In so holding, eight Justices agreed that Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971), a fourteenth amendment equal protection decision, was a control-
ling precedent.
Similarly, in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 632 (1974), the Court cited Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), also a fourteenth amendment deci-
sion, in deciding the constitutionality of a denial by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare of benefits to illegitimate children of disabled, insured parents.
ment, it is also inconsistent with the due process requirement of the
Fifth Amendment."8 3
The Supreme Court's approach to governmental discriminatory
classification involves three standards of review.8 4 The first level of
review is termed the "strict scrutiny" test, utilized when the classifi-
cation infringes on a fundamental constitutional right.8 5 The second
level of review is termed the "rational relationship" test, which ap-
plies to general economic and welfare legislation.8 6 The third stan-
dard falls between the first and second levels and is generally
referred to as the "middle-tier" test.8 7 The Court has utilized mid-
dle-tier analysis when it wishes to afford less deference to legislative
judgments not involving fundamental rights.88
III. THE PROBLEM
On November 23, 1982, the Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group,89 a college student-directed nonprofit corporation, brought an
action in the United States District Court9 O seeking to enjoin the op-
eration of section 1113 of the Department of Defense Authorization
83. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364-65 n.4 (1974).
84. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 75, at 590-600.
85. In contrast to economic and social regulatory action, state action that discrimi-
nates against suspect classifications or impinges the exercise of a fundamental right
will violate equal protection unless necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest.
Cases delineating fundamental rights include: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right
of a uniquely private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to vote);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by the first amendment); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate). Suspect classes have been found in
the following cases: Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)
(ancestry).
86. The rational relationship test is traditionally stated as whether the govern-
mental classification is "rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest."
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). Further, "equal protection analysis requires
strict scrutiny [analysis] only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
87. The concept of middle-tier analysis was identified by Professor Gunther in a
landmark article, Gunther, Forward:- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
88. The middle tier was formally adopted in gender-based classification cases and
stated as whether the government can demonstrate that the classification is "substan-
tially related to achievement of [important governmental] objectives." Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Further, the Court has informally adopted this standard in
other types of classifications. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (education of
illegal alien's minors); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (legitimacy classifications).
89. Hereinafter referred to as Public Interest Group.
90. Doe v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 937 (D. Minn. 1983).
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Act of 1983. 91 Section 1113 requires draft-age males who desire any
form of assistance or benefit provided under Title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 196592 to comply with the registration requirements
of section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act.93 Not only must
draft-age males comply with the requirements of the Act, but a state-
ment of compliance must be filed with any educational institution
which is or may be attended by such male. Failure to do so results in
the forfeiture of Title IV assistance. 94 The district court dismissed
the Public Interest Group for lack of standing9 5 but allowed three
anonymous students to intervene as plaintiffs.96
91. Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718 (1982) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f)
(1982)).
The full text of section 1113, also referred to as the Solomon Amendment, is as
follows:
(f) (1) Any person who is required under section 3 to present himself for and
submit to registration under such section and fails to do so in accordance with
any proclamation issued under such section, or in accordance with any rule or
regulation issued under such section, shall be ineligible for any form of assist-
ance or benefit provided under title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965.
(2) In order to receive any grant, loan, or work assistance under title IV of
the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq.), a person who is re-
quired under section 3 to present himself for and submit to registration under
such section shall file with the institution of higher education which the per-
son intends to attend, or is attending, a statement of compliance with section 3
and regulations issued thereunder.
(3) The Secretary of Education, in agreement with the Director, shall pre-
scribe methods for verifying such statements of compliance filed pursuant to
paragragh (2). Such methods may include requiring institutions of higher ed-
ucation to provide a list to the Secretary of Education or to the Director of
persons who have submitted such statements of compliance.
(4) The Secretary of Education, in consultation with the Director, shall is-
sue regulations to implement the requirements of this subsection. Such regu-
lations shall provide that any person to whom the Secretary of Education
proposes to deny assistance or benefits under title IV for failure to meet the
registration requirements of section 3 and regulations issued thereunder shall
be given notice of the proposed denial and shall have a suitable period (of not
less than 30 days) after such notice to provide the Secretary with information
and materials establishing that he has complied with the registration require-
ment under section 3. Such regulations shall also provide that the Secretary
may afford such person an opportunity for a hearing to establish his compli-
ance or for any other purpose.
50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f) (1982) (emphasis added).
92. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-1089 (1982).
93. Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1982), re-
quires every male citizen and every male resident alien residing in the United States
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six to register for the draft as determined by
proclamation of the President. Section 12 of the Act imposes criminal penalties for
willful failure to comply with the Act.
94. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f)(2) (1982).
95. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. at 925.
96. Id. The three anonymous students, Joe Doe, Richard Roe and Paul Poe [here-
The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a temporary re-
straining order,97 but granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the government 98 from enforcing section 1113.9 9 The court limited
the preliminary injunction to enforcement only, allowing the govern-
ment to promulgate new regulations 0o governing section 1113 pend-
ing final determination of the constitutionality of that section.1 01
On July 5, 1984, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the district court. The preliminary injunction granted
by the district court was dissolved, thereby enabling the government
to enforce section 1113.102
IV. MAJORITY OPINION
A. Section 1113 Determined to be Constitutional Legislation
The central issue in Selective Service System was whether section
1113 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983103 was
an unconstitutional bill of attainder. 0 4 Chief Justice Burger, deliver-
inafter referred to as plaintiffs], alleged that they resided in Minnesota, needed finan-
cial aid to pursue their educations, intended to apply for Title IV assistance, and were
required to register with the Selective Service System but had failed to do so. Doe, 557
F. Supp. at 938. Two days later, three other anonymous students, Bradley Boe, Carl
Coe and Frank Foe, filed a similar complaint. The two actions were informally consol-
idated. Brief for Appellant at 7, Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3348.
97. Brief for Appellant at 7, Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3348.
98. The government was comprised of the following: Selective Service System;
Major-General Thomas Turnage, Director of the Selective Service System; United
States Department of Education; and Terrel H. Bell, Secretary of the United States
Department of Education [hereinafter referred to as the government].
99. Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 937. The district court, in deciding whether to issue a pre-
liminary injunction, followed the standards set out in Dataphase Sys. v. C.L. Sys., 640
F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981):
Whether a preliminary injunction should issue involves consideration of (1)
the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between
this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on the other
parties litigant; (3) the probability that the movant will succeed on the merits;
and (4) the public interest.
Id& at 114.
In Doe, the court made the following findings: first, plaintiffs faced irreparable in-
jury in that they would be denied financial assistance necessary to complete their edu-
cations; second, the threat of irreparable harm outweighed any potential injury to
defendar.ts and the plaintiffs established a probability of success on the merits; third,
the plaintiffs would probably succeed in showing that section 1113 constitutes a bill of
attainder and that it violated plaintiffs' fifth amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination; and, fourth, the public interest favored the issuance of a preliminary in-
junction. 557 F. Supp. at 940-41, 947, 950.
100. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
101. Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 941.
102. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3348. Justice Blackmun took no part in the
decision, Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, and Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall wrote separate dissenting opinions.
103. See supra note 91 citing the full text of section 1113.
104. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text for a full discussion of bills of
attainder.
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ing the opinion of the majority, centered his analysis on whether the
statute inflicts legislative punishment. In deciding this critical ques-
tion, he adopted the three-part test espoused by the Court in Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services.105 The three necessary inquir-
ies were: (1) whether the statute inflicts punishment historically as-
sociated with bills of attainder; (2) whether the statute can
reasonably "be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes;" and
(3) whether the legislative history "evidences a congressional intent
to punish."106
1. An ambiguity on the face of the statute
Before reaching the issue of legislative punishment, the Court con-
sidered an ambiguity arising on the face of the statute. Section 1113
requires male applicants to register for the draft "in accordance"
with any proclamation issued under the Military Selective Service
Act.10 7 Additionally, Proclamation No. 4771 requires young men to
register for the draft within thirty days of their eighteenth birth-
day.10 8 The district court construed the language of section 1113 as
requiring registration within the time fixed by Proclamation No.
4771, thereby precluding late registrants from ever receiving Title IV
financial aid.10 9 The majority rejected the district court's conclusion,
declaring it to be inconsistent with both the structure of section 1113
and its legislative history.11 0
The majority pointed out that the statute itself requires the Secre-
tary of Education to implement regulations providing for notice of a
proposed denial of financial aid."' The applicant receiving such no-
tice is given no less than thirty days to comply with the registration
requirement and to establish his eligibility for receiving the aid.112 If
section 1113 is construed to require registration within the time limit
fixed by Proclamation No. 4771, the whole purpose of the notice re-
quirement would be completely undermined, as those not having
timely registered would be forever denied financial aid.
105. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
106. Id. at 475-76.
107. 50 U.S.C app. § 462(f)(1) (1982).
108. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 453 at 233-34 (1982).
109. Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 942.
110. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3354.
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the imple-
mented regulations.
The majority also found that the district court ignored relevant
legislative history in construing the language of the statute. Various
legislative remarks were referred to as support for the contention
that Congress' motive in implementing section 1113 was to encourage
registration."13 Along with the notice requirement, this legislative
purpose would be undermined if the statute was construed in accord-
ance with the thirty day time limit. The court delineated its judicial
duty as "not to destroy the Act [if possible] but to construe it, if con-
sistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with Constitu-
tional limitations."" 4 Therefore, the Court found that section 1113
did not make late registrants ineligible for financial assistance.115
2. Application of the Nixon three-part test
The majority applied the Nixon three-part test to determine the
existence of legislative punishment. The traditional punishments as-
sociated with bills of attainder" 6 were examined, in compliance with
the first Nixon inquiry. As the denial of Title IV financial aid is a
mere denial of a contractual governmental benefit, it falls far short
of reaching the historical concept of a bill of attainder punishment.
Additionally, any non-registrant can become eligible for Title IV aid
at any time, simply by registering late.117
The Court focused on legislative history to determine whether the
statute furthered a non-punitive purpose, in applying the second
Nixon inquiry. Statements of various legislators were adopted to en-
courage registration by disbursing Title IV financial aid only to those
who had done so.118 Additionally, Senator Hayakawa supported the
explanation that section 1113 provides for a fair allocation of scarce
federal resources"n 9
113. 128 CONG. REC. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Whitehurst);
ici at H4758 (remarks of Rep. Simon); id, at H4770 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); 128
CONG. REC. S4943 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); i& at 84945
(remarks of Sen. Jepson).
Various legislators stressed that those failing to timely register could still qualify for
financial aid by registering late. 128 CONG. REc. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (re-
marks of Rep. Whitehurst); id at H4758 (remarks by Rep. Simon); id. at H4769 (re-
marks by Rep. Montgomery); i& at H4770 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); 128 CONG. REC.
S4945 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Stennis).
114. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3355 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973)).
115. The Court emphasized the escapability aspect of section 1113. Any nonregis-
trant can, at any time, register late and qualify himself for Title IV aid. Id.
116. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of traditional bill
of attainder punishment.
117. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3356.
118. 128 CONG. REC. H4758 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks by Rep. Solomon); id
at H4770 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); 128 CONG. REc. S4943 (daily ed. May 12, 1982)
(remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); id. at S4945 (remarks of Sen. Stennis).
119. Senator Hayakawa stated:
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Finally, in applying the third Nixon inquiry, the Court found that
certain aspects of the statute negated the existence of a punitive in-
tent. Section 1113 prohibits both innocent and willful nonregistrants
from receiving Title IV financial aid.120 As punitive legislation ordi-
narily reaches only those who willfully violate the law, Congress
must have intended the Act to serve as a valid regulation rather than
as a punitive measure.121 Emphasis was placed on the fact that Con-
gress allowed all nonregistrants to receive financial aid simply by
registering late, instead of choosing to inflict punishment for failure
to do so within the time prescribed by Proclamation No. 4771.122
In short, applying the Nixon analysis, it was concluded that section
1113 was not a bill of attainder. It failed to inflict punishment tradi-
tionally associated with bills of attainder, it failed to evidence a legis-
lative intent to punish, and it could reasonably be said to further non-
punitive legislative purposes.
B. Side-Stepping Equal Protection and Self-Incrimination
The majority quickly disposed of both the self-incrimination and
equal protection issues. The argument that section 1113 compels
nonregistrants to acknowledge their failure to register timely in com-
pleting the required registration compliance form was rejected. A
nonregistrant is under no compulsion to seek financial aid; he is sim-
ply ineligible for such aid. Even if a nonregistrant decided to register
late, in an effort to comply with the requirements of section 1113, the
statement of compliance does not require him to disclose that fact.123
Therefore, a late registrant is not compelled to disclose any incrimi-
nating information in order to be eligible for financial aid.124
The more difficult requirement confronting the Court was that an
applicant must disclose his failure to register timely when he subse-
quently registers with the Selective Service. He must complete a
During these times of extreme budgetary constraints, times when even the
most worthwhile programs are cut back drastically, this Government has
every obligation to see that Federal dollars are spent in the most fair and pru-
dent manner possible.. . . If students want to further their education at the
expense of their country, they cannot expect these benefits to be provided
without accepting their fair share of the responsibilities to that Government.
128 CONG. REC. S4943 (daily ed. May 12, 1982).
120. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3357.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3358.
123. An applicant is only required to state that he is in compliance with the regis-
tration law. Id.
124. 1&
draft registration card which requires him to state his date of birth
along with the date of registration. 12 5 Nonregistrants argued that this
constitutes self-incrimination in violation of the fifth amendment.
The Court stated, however, that none of the parties to the action had
registered; therefore, none of them had been confronted with the
need to assert his fifth amendment privilege in lieu of disclosing his
birth date. As the parties before the Court had not, as yet, been de-
nied Title IV aid based on the assertion of their fifth amendment
rights, they could not claim that those rights had been violated.126
Not only was the argument that section 1113 violates the right
against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment rejected, the
argument that the statute violates equal protection under the fifth
amendment was also rejected. Nonregistrants argued that section
1113 discriminates on the basis of wealth; however, the Court found
that section 1113 denied aid to both poor and wealthy nonregistrants
indiscriminately. Furthermore, even if the statute did discriminate
based on wealth, it would be constitutional "if rationally related to a
legitimate government interest."'127 The Court concluded that such a
rational relationship did exist. Therefore, section 1113 does not vio-
late equal protection under the fifth amendment.128
V. JUSTICE POWELL'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Powell concurred with the majority opinion in part and
concurred in the judgment. In so doing, he stated that "the [b]ill of
[a]ttainder issue . . . should have been disposed of solely on the
ground that [section] . . . 1113 is not punitive legislation.' '129 He ra-
tionalized his decision, as did the majority, by stating that section
1113 provided a benefit to eligible students at the taxpayers' expense.
Additionally, no individual is compelled to request the benefit, and
no identifiable group is singled out to be discriminated against by the
government.130
Justice Powell disapproved of the majority's reliance on the inter-
pretation of the language of section 1113 as expressed in the imple-
menting regulations.'13 The statute is not punitive; therefore, the
majority unnecessarily delved into additional arguments to support
that decision.13 2
125. See 32 C.F.R. § 1615.4 (1984).
126. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3359.
127. Id. at 3359 n.17 (citing Harris v. McKae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-24 (1980)).
128. Id. at 3359.
129. Id,
130. Id. at 3360.
131. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
132. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3360-61.
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VI. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S DISSENT
A. A Violation of Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that section 1113 is not a
bill of attainder.133 He did, however, conclude that section 1113 vio-
lates the right against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment.
He was joined by Justice Brennan in his dissent on this issue.
The basis for Justice Marshall's dissent was not that the Title IV
application process compelled a student to reveal incriminating infor-
mation. Instead, he believed that section 1113 coerced registration
with the Selective Service, which, in turn, commanded the individual
to disclose incriminating information directly to the government. 3 4
He determined that an individual, by registering late, provided to the
government crucial information necessary for his prosecution. First,
he must state his birth date and registration date. 3 5 Second, the
very act of registering late calls to the government's attention that he
is one of the 674,000 men who have violated the Military Selective
Service Act.136
Justice Marshall further contended that late registration creates a
"real and appreciable" risk of prosecution. First, both the registra-
tion form and the acknowledgement letter state that any information
given by the individual may be sent to the'Department of Justice and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation upon a suspected violation of the
Military Selective Service Act.'37 Additionally, in 1982, President
Reagan announced a "grace period," permitting young men to regis-
ter late without threat of prosecution.138 Justice Marshall pointed
out the implication that, after the expiration of the "grace period,"
late registrants faced a substantial risk of self-incrimination and
prosecution. 139
Having concluded that late registration is a self-incriminating act,
Justice Marshall discussed whether section 1113 operates to coerce
self-incrimination through late registration. He began by stating that
133. Justice Marshall acknowledged that the majority correctly decided the bill of
attainder issue based on construing the statute to permit late registration. Permitting
late registration evidences a congressional intent to encourage compliance with the re-
gistration requirement rather than to punish nonregistrants. Id at 3363.
134. Id at 3364.
135. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (1982).
136. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3364.
137. Id.
138. Registration Under the Military Selective Service Act, 18 WEEKLY CoMP.
PREs. Doc. 8 (Jan. 7, 1982).
139. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3364-65.
the denial of student aid constitutes substantial economic coercion.140
In today's market, post-secondary education is absolutely necessary
for entry into most trades and professions. Thus, a nonregistrant in
need of financial aid must either abandon his hopes for obtaining a
valuable degree, or register late to qualify for financial aid. This
forced decision creates economic coercion.141
Justice Marshall had difficulty with the majority's contention that
individuals must claim their right against self-incrimination before
they can assert that right in court.142 An individual, by exercising his
fifth amendment rights in refusing to complete a registration form, is
incriminating himself as effectively as if he had filled out the form in
its entirety.143 The basis for this contention is that a late registrant,
by exercising his fifth amendment rights rather than supplying the
incriminating information, puts the government on notice of his re-
fusal to cooperate; he thereby loses his anonymity.14 4 The individual,
by exercising his fifth amendment rights, is losing his freedom to
withhold his identity from the federal government. 145 Although con-
ceding that the government has a substantial interest in encouraging
compliance with the draft registration requirement, Justice Marshall
concluded that section 1113 is unconstitutional absent any statutory
grant of immunity to those individuals compelled to incriminate
themselves.14 6
B. A Violation of Equal Protection
Justice Marshall also criticized the majority's treatment of the
equal protection issue. He considered section 1113 to be discrimina-
tory based on wealth and saw the majority decision as another exam-
ple of an indifference to realities of life for the poor.147 In his view,
the equal protection analysis should involve three basic determina-
140. Id. at 3365. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of
economic coercion.
141. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3365.
142. Id. at 3366.
143. Id Justice Marshall quoted Justice Brennan who stated that a "statutory sys-
tem ... utilized to pierce the anonymity of citizens engaged in criminal activity, is in-
valid." Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 76 (1968) (Brennan, J., concurring).
144. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3368. Justice Marshall cited to Minnesota v.
Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1147 (1984), to support his contention that any risk of prosecu-
tion may be cured by a statutory grant of immunity.
145. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3368. Justice Marshall cited to his dissent in
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146. The grant of immunity would evidence a congressional intent not to punish
nonregistrants but to promote compliance with the registration requirement. See Mur-
phy, 104 S. Ct. at 1147 n.7 ("a state may validly insist on answers to even incriminating
questions ... as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a
criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination.").
147. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3368 (quoting Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 166
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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tions: (1) the character of the classification at issue; (2) the impor-
tance of the governmental benefits to the class of individuals denied
those benefits; and (3) the governmental interest supporting the
classification.148
Justice Marshall began by criticizing the majority's opinion that
section 1113 treats all nonregistrants alike. The practical effect of
the statute is to discriminate against those in need of financial assist-
ance. The wealthy are not affected by the statute for they are not in
need of such assistance. Statistical studies were referred to for sup-
port of this contention.1 49 The result is that the wealthy are not re-
quired to file compliance statements with the Selective Service as are
the poor. This lack of compulsion is due to the fact that a wealthy
individual's education is unaffected by the existence or nonexistence
of financial aid. Therefore, the government is treating nonregistrants
unequally based on wealth.150
Justice Marshall further supported his view by emphasizing the
importance of an education. Individuals have an extraordinary inter-
est in education as it "provides the basic tools by which [they] might
lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all."151 Indeed,
he believed the interest in education to be fundamental.1 52
In conclusion, Justice Marshall criticized the majority's approval of
section 1113 based on the contention that it is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective. Such a relationship does not jus-
tify subjecting different classes of individuals to different levels of
punishment. Even the House sponsor of the statute recognized an el-
ement of discrimination.1 3 Finally, Justice Marshall re-emphasized
148. I& (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
149. According to the United States Department of Education, approximately three
out of four post-secondary students with family incomes below $6,000 receive Title IV
aid. Only eight percent of students with family incomes over $30,000 receive any finan-
cial assistance. U.S. Dep't of Educ. Office of Student Financial Assistance, OSFA Pro-
gram Book 18 (July 1981).
150. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3369.
151. Id (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221).
152. 104 S. Ct. at 3370. Justice Marshall stated that education bears a fundamental
relationship to our most basic constitutional values. Id.
153. 128 CONG. REC. H4767 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (statement of Rep. Solomon).
Representative Solomon stated:
Now, maybe we are discriminating against the poor. And if we are, I guaran-
tee I am going to come back with legislation on this floor tomorrow and the
next day and the next day and every day this session with amendments that
will prohibit any funds from being used for the Job Training Act if they are
not registered, for any unemployment compensation insurance if they are not
registered, and for any kind of taxpayers' money if they are not registered.
Id.
that the importance of an education is too basic, and the discrimina-
tion inherent in the statute too great, to uphold the constitutionality
of section 1113.154
VII. IMPACT
Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group will undoubtedly have a significant impact on future federal
legislation. The decision paves the way for increased governmental
intrusion into personal freedom. It indicates that the Supreme Court
is willing to give Congress a greater range of power to impose civil
penalties on those failing to conform with the law. The decision also
indicates that the Supreme Court is swinging toward a narrow, more
conservative interpretation of the Constitution.
Section 1113 has an obvious purpose: to promote compliance with
the draft registration requirement. This purpose, in and of itself, is
legitimate in a strong defense-oriented society such as the United
States. However, the means chosen to promote such compliance in-
volves the denial of educational financial aid to those who have failed
to register, whether willfully or unintentionally. 155 Education seems
fundamental in today's society and is completely unrelated to draft
registration.
The question then arises: "How far may Congress go in passing leg-
islation restricting governmental benefits based on civil disobedi-
ence?" For example, the decision raises the possibility that Congress
may limit the availability of Medicaid and other social benefits to
those having performed an illegal act or engaged in civil disobedi-
ence. Furthermore, those desiring such benefits may be forced to file
a written certification denying their involvement in any illegal act.
Such legislation will necessarily result in the chipping away of consti-
tutional guarantees which play an essential role in the protection of
personal liberty.
Those directly affected by section 1113 are now faced with a di-
lemma: whether to register late and qualify for Title IV financial aid,
thereby subjecting themselves to possible criminal prosecution, or to
remain unregistered, thereby denying themselves the opportunity to
obtain a valuable education. The impact of section 1113 upon those
individuals is severe.
Consider a young man who has failed to register within thirty days
of his eighteenth birthday. Suppose further that this young man
failed to register due to his moral outrage against the possibility of
killing another human being. After Selective Service System, this
154. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3371.
155. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f) (1982).
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young man has subjected himself to two possible sanctions. First, the
Selective Service Act itself provides for imprisonment and a fine for
willful notiregistration.1 56 Second, section 1113 prohibits all nonregis-
trants from receiving Title IV educational financial aid.157
The constitutionality of imprisonment and/or a fine for willful
nonregistration is not at issue; therefore, the additional sanction im-
posed by section 1113 seems to be both unnecessary and oppressive.
No rational relationship exists between the act (failing to register)
and the punishment imposed (denial of educational financial aid).
Additionally, there seems to be no legitimate reason for imposing a
punishment which will affect only poor or middle class nonregis-
trants who desire to further their education. Poor, middle class and
wealthy nonregistrants have committed the same offense, yet only
the poor or middle class will be denied access to funds necessary to
complete their educations.
It is true that a nonregistrant simply has to register with the Selec-
tive Service to become eligible for financial aid. This, however, over-
looks the fact that a late registrant is still subject to prosecution for
failing to register within thirty days of his eighteenth birthday, as
mandated by the Selective Service Act. As the act of late registration
puts the government on notice of the young man's name, address and
birthdate, late registration may increase the possibility of prosecu-
tion. Thus, a nonregistrant may forego financial aid, along with his
chance to obtain a valuable education, for fear of such prosecution.
In today's society, post-secondary education is an absolute prerequi-
site for entrance into most professions and for employment on many
levels. Additionally, many students are able to complete their educa-
tion only through some form of financial assistance. Section 1113 de-
nies middle class and poor nonregistrants the ability to receive the
necessary loans or grants essential to their college education. Such a
sanction is applied regardless of the scholastic achievements or the
potential of an individual desiring to further his education. The re-
sult is that the unfortunate victim of section 1113 may be denied a
key to the educational gates which could free him from an existence
in poverty and ignorance.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Post-secondary education, as an American opportunity, is essential
156. Id § 462.
157. 1& § 462(f).
in modern society. Indeed, Justice Marshall considers education to
be fundamental to our basic constitutional values.158 Legislation ef-
fectively denying an individual access to financial aid necessary to
further his education, should therefore be closely scrutinized.
The decision in Selective Service System, however, seems to have
been based on a superficial reading of section 1113, rather than on a
practical look at the effect of the statute. The decision implies that if
a law seems to be constitutional on its face, the effect of that law is of
little significance. The Court, in an effort to coerce compliance with
the draft registration requirement, overlooked encroachments on the
fifth amendment guarantees of equal protection and the privilege
against self-incrimination.
TERESA L. HOWELL
158. Selective Serv. Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 3370. See supra note 152.
